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Association of Chief Police Officer of England,
Wales & Northern Ireland

GUIDANCE ON MEDIA HANDLING AND COMMUNICATION ACTIVITY AT MAJOR INCIDENTS (INCLUDING COUNTER TERRORISM)

Status: This Presidential Business Area Guidance has been developed to encourage consistency of practice by police forces but is issued only for their guidance. It is a matter for individual Chief Constables, in conjunction with their media advisors, to decide whether, and how, the notes should be implemented. The Guidance has been agreed at ACPO Cabinet and is disclosable under FOIA 2000.

Implementation

Date:

Review Date:

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BACKGROUND

These guidance notes have been drawn up by the Media Advisory Group (MAG) of the Association of Chief Police Officers, following consultation with representative media bodies and Forces who have experience of major incident handling and counter terrorism work.

The notes aim to encourage consistency of practice by police forces but are issued only for their guidance. It is a matter for individual chief constables, in conjunction with their media advisers, to decide whether, and how, the notes should be implemented. The Media Advisory Group would indeed expect that if chief constables decide to implement the guidance they will adapt them in the light of local circumstances and following such consultation with the media in their area as they felt necessary.

In addition, it should be noted that most Forces do not have the capacity to undertake all of the good practice contained in this document. Smaller Forces in particular may have to institute mutual aid arrangements with their colleagues in other areas, identify additional resources in emergency situations or adopt only key parts of this guidance within the constraints of their resources.

This paper has been divided into two sections:

- Media handling at a major incident (Section 1)
- Media handling at a counter terrorism related incident (Section 2)

Both sections include an A-Z of good practice. The appendices at the back of this paper highlight a number of useful reference documents, including the ACPO National Community Tension Team guidance document on the correct use of language when dealing with a counter terrorism related incident, and media, communications and engagement strategies.

Underlying Principles and Objectives

The police service is a public body which is committed to a relationship with the public, communities and the media which is as open as possible, while giving due regard to operational and investigative issues and confidentiality.

The media have specific needs and requirements in the event of a major incident and we should seek to be in a position to offer them quick, accurate and authoritative information in a positive and coordinated way. We must then ensure that this information remains accurate and up to date.

We also recognise that the media and the police service must maintain a professional relationship in order to ensure that the public are kept informed in the event of major incidents, operations and terrorism-related incidents.

This guidance note aims to indicate best practice in media relations and communications in the context of major incidents and operations and is based on the considerable experience of UK forces.

Individual incidents may be complex and varied in nature; and it is important that there is a flexible approach to dealing with them which reflects local needs. However, these guidelines will assist Forces in developing their capability.

SECTION 1

GOOD PRACTICE MEDIA HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS AT A

MAJOR INCIDENT

Definition of a Major Incident

A major incident is any emergency (including known or suspected acts of terrorism) that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency services, and will generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people. Under the Civil Contingencies Act it is any event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security. Such an incident could involve:

- The rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties;
- The large-scale combined resources of the police, fire service and ambulance service;
- The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting services, e.g. a local authority or health authority; and
- The handling of a large number of inquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the media, usually to police.

A major incident may be declared by any officer from one of the emergency services. Once it has been declared, a Gold Coordinating group will be put in place to coordinate the operational response, including media and communications. The police take the operational and media and communications lead in any major incident.

The two different categories of responders involved in a major incident are:

Category One Responders

Emergency services

- Police
- Fire and Rescue Service
- Ambulance Service
- British Transport Police
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency
- Local authorities
- Health bodies, e.g. primary care trusts, acute trusts, foundation trusts, Health Protection Agency
- Government Agencies, e.g. Environment Agency

Category Two Responders

Utilities

- Electricity distributors and transmitters
- Gas distributors
- Water and sewerage service providers
- Telephone service providers (landline and mobile)

Transport

- Network Rail
- Train operating companies (passenger and freight)
- Airport operators
- Highways Agency

Health Bodies

- Strategic Health Authorities
- Health and Safety Executive

Other Government bodies and agencies

- COBRA
- Government News Network
- ACPO PNICC

Major Incident Contingency Plans

Each Force has major incident contingency plans, which include a communications strategy and responsibility for taking the communications and media relations lead on behalf of the other emergency services and partner agencies.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 places a responsibility on police forces to have in place emergency plans and business continuity management arrangements. Police forces and local authorities should also devise and implement arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency. For further information, visit www.ukresilience.info

Business continuity plans should also include media and communications options in the event of main media offices becoming unavailable. This should include alternative locations to which media and communications professionals can relocate, including detailed considerations of facilities and requirements and, if possible site maps.

Purposes of Communications Activity in a Major Incident

The purposes of police communications and media relations in a major incident are:

- To maintain confidence in the Force and other public agencies involved in dealing with the incident;
- To support the operational policing objectives, specifically the prevention of loss of life and detection of those responsible for any crime committed;
- To keep the public fully informed; and
- To assist in the management of community impact and any consequences arising from an incident, e.g. potential tension between communities.

General Principles

Communications staff should be integrated into planning and given as much information as possible about the operation, investigation or incident in order to facilitate effective media strategy and tactical planning.

Media relations should be given a sufficiently high priority in strategic and tactical planning to enable effective communications to take place.

Internal communications can be as important as external communications and should be considered as part of the overall strategy. Communications with stakeholders should also be included.

Plans should be prepared in advance, tested regularly and every effort should be made to ensure that staff are fully aware of their roles should a major incident be declared.

Partners and other organisations, such as the media, should be kept as well-informed as possible.

Communications staff should be given sufficient access to decision-makers, in particular the Gold Commander. There should be adequate mechanisms in place between formal meetings to ensure that information for the public and media can be effectively dealt with in order to deal with inaccuracies, speculation and information requests.

Identification of Communications Roles

It is useful to agree designated roles in relation to communications and media handling in advance of any incident occurring. A broad suggested outline of key roles are included below. A suggested template for adaptation or use is also included at Appendix (I) at the end of this document.

Gold (Media and Communications)

A Press Office/corporate communications representative should always be integrated into the Gold group in order to ensure that communications and media issues are considered as part of operational and investigative planning. This person should have extensive experience of dealing with the media, wherever possible from a policing perspective.

The role of the Gold Communications and Media Liaison Officer is to create and advise on media and communications strategy, including broader implications, such as community and internal communications and the needs of particular audiences, groups of people or stakeholders.

They should also be a conduit for information or intelligence arising from media enquiries and media coverage into the Gold group to aid decision-making.

Staff who are likely to have a place on the Gold Group should be vetted to at least security cleared level. It may also be worth considering Developed Vetting for staff who may require access to information related to counter terrorism activity. See Vetting under A-Z of Good practice in Section 2.

Gold (Spokesperson)

In the event of a major incident, a spokesperson of ACPO rank should be appointed to undertake media interviews. This is in order to reflect the seriousness of the situation and promote public and stakeholder reassurance. Wherever possible one or two spokespeople should be used on a consistent and ongoing basis to provide stability and confidence to the public.

Media Liaison Manager (Silver)

Their role is to ensure coordination of media relations activity in relation to the incident and to ensure that sufficient resources are available to deal with the event on an ongoing basis, including:

- Ensuring that tactical objectives are delivered in support of the Gold media strategy.

Inter-agency Liaison (Bronze)

To coordinate a 'partnership cell' or group of communications professionals to ensure that activity is consistent in support of the Gold communications strategy.

Ideally, this role should be performed by a senior press or PR officer.

Media Liaison Officer — Scene (Bronze)

Depending on the incident, a Media Liaison Officer should be dispatched to the scene of the incident. A risk assessment must be carried out prior to this taking place, particularly in the case of an incident which may be terrorism-related.

A media RVP should be identified and information about this passed to the media as soon as possible.

Do not underestimate the level of media interest and the effects this may have on operational activity at the scene of an incident. It is often necessary to allocate police resources to manage the media at the scene of an incident.

Media Briefing Centre Manager (Bronze)

In the case of any major incident, a location for a media briefing centre should be identified.

As far as possible, the media briefing centre should include access to power supplies, telephone lines and other necessary equipment, both for police and partners' press officers and for the media themselves. This can take some time to set up and may be impracticable in the early stages of an incident, when it may be necessary to coordinate media relations activity from existing press office facilities. Ideally, there should be the capacity for live feeds in terms of power and location, although the provision of the feeds themselves is the responsibility of the media outlets.

The centre manager may need assistance in obtaining logistical support for setting up the centre, for instance from IT, utilities companies etc.

Media Monitoring (Bronze)

Real-time media monitoring is vital if the police and partners are to effectively manage media activity.

It is necessary to:

- Identify inaccuracies and seek to correct them as quickly as possible;
- Identify potential intelligence and information and submit to the Gold Coordinating Group;
- Consider questions submitted by journalists and the effect of journalists' information-gathering as part of the overall communications strategy; and
- Ensure that written summaries of media coverage are logged and communicated to the Gold Group via the Gold (Media and Communications)

It is important to include websites, plus Ceefax and Teletext in the monitoring exercise.

Community Communications (Bronze)

It is important to consider the impact incidents may have on particular sections of the community. Best practice in this area indicates that communications professionals should be included in consequences management cells/groups set up for this purpose. This may be an area which could be delegated to a Press Officer from a partner organisation such as the local council.

It is necessary to consider media coverage and media handling as one of the critical factors in determining community impact. A variety of communications tactics can also be used as part of strategies to manage community impact. This activity must be correlated to media work and

local policing strategies.

Logistics Manager (Bronze)

The difficulty of managing shift patterns, providing sustenance, seeking mutual aid, monitoring media coverage, undertaking risk assessments and so on should not be underestimated, particularly where a major incident is ongoing and 24/7 shifts need to be introduced.

Resilience is a major issue for all Forces, particularly where they have a small number of communications staff.

The appointment of an administrative manager to deal with these issues is recommended in order to ensure that they do not detract from providing a quality media handling and communications service in the event of a major incident.

Other roles could include:

E: Communications (Bronze)

The Internet is a valuable and internationally-accessible method of disseminating information. It may be of some value to establish a mechanism whereby information on a major incident can be created remotely and as soon as possible after the incident is declared, e.g. A substitute website front page which can be quickly made live.

Other forms of e:communications could be utilized in support of the Gold communications strategy.

Internal Communications (Bronze)

To ensure that everyone in the Force is up-to-date with the latest information, e.g. via Intranet sites. This would include messages being given to the media and the public and links to officer and staff briefings.

Images (Bronze)

Where in-house photography or imaging is available, this can give a significant advantage in terms of providing images or video to the media, with the approval of the Officer in Charge (OIC). This would not be a substitute for consideration of media access to the scene if possible, but could provide an early or interim solution.

Family\Victim Liaison (Bronze)

This is likely to be resource intensive where there are multiple casualties.

However, it is an important role, to be undertaken in close liaison and agreement with Family Liaison Officers (FLO), Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and the Officer in the Case (OIC)

General press office roles

It may be useful to split roles in the Press Office into call takers (who take and log calls from the media) and information loggists (who log any information issued by the police and ensures

it is communicated to all who may need to see it, which could include any/all of partners, key internal stakeholders, Force switchboard operators, Home Office etc).

Other Roles

These could include any/all of the following, who could be from the police or other agencies:

- Bronze (knowledge management)
- Bronze (research)
- Bronze (Health issues)
- Bronze (Non-incident related business)
- Bronze (PIVOT), where PIVOT is used.
- Bronze (Business)
- Bronze (Event Assistance Centre)

PIVOT

PIVOT is a system which collates and disseminates fast-time information from Gold Control, Media and Communications Departments, other operational resources, local and central Government, other emergency services and partner agencies. The channeling of information through one central point is aimed at ensuring that the police service does not release unconfirmed or conflicting statements to the media.

Appendix (i) contains potential templates for use or adaptation in relation to the roles identified above.

MAJOR INCIDENT MEDIA HANDLING **A-Z OF GOOD PRACTICE**

The following is an alphabetical list of issues in which good practice has been developed and/or identified. This list is not exhaustive and it is proposed to update this guidance annually based on any new experience, knowledge or developments.

Abbreviations and Jargon

Many terms and abbreviations used in the event of major incidents are complex and/or sensitive. These should not be used when dealing with the media or with partner organisations, unless fully explained and agreed with key parties. See also **Language** listed in the **A-Z** in **Section 2**

Access to Key Decision-Makers

Effective management of the media relies upon having access to information, plus access to those who can approve its release. The object should be to issue fast, accurate and appropriate information.

The initial swift release of information is of key importance in dealing with any major incident. Therefore the Gold communications officer should have regular and ready access to the strategic commander of the incident.

Media and communications issues must be given an appropriately high profile as part of Strategic Co-ordination Group (SCG) or Gold meetings and sufficient time allocated for discussion of the strategy and issues. They should not be viewed as a 'bolt on' activity at the end of the meeting when people are anxious to leave. See the suggested Gold Group Agenda at appendix (ii).

Maintaining media and communications activity between SCG or Gold meetings is also crucial and consideration should be given to devolving decision-making about media issues to an appropriate person, e.g. Gold Communications and Media Officer plus ACPO spokesperson, in between meetings. Decisions should only be made about releasing new information in liaison with key stakeholders, such as Sb, Divisional Commanders, CPS, community representatives etc. It is important to trust communications professionals to consider the implications of information and seek appropriate approvals. It is also important for the Gold Commander to stress that information should be provided and not withheld from communications professionals as far as possible. See also Vetting listed in the **A-Z** in **Section 2**.

Accreditation - Media

All media wishing to attend press conferences or briefings held at a media briefing centre during a major incident would only be allowed access if they have a valid NUJ card or a UK Press Card. International media representatives should also produce equivalent identification/documentation. We need to ensure that the media are aware of this so they know that they need to be registered with these agencies and always carry valid identification. See also The UK **Press Card** at Appendix vi).

ACPO PNICC

The Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNICC) is the operational arm of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). PNICC is an established full time organisation that supplies mutual aid to forces at times of extraordinary demand. It also collates information, enabling ACPO to brief Government, usually through Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) when it sits, of significant events.

PNICC overarches natural disasters, international and national; CBRN; counter terrorism; major crime investigations; major public order events; and planned and spontaneous and industrial disputes. It can be activated by the ACPO President, an ACPO vice-president or the Chief of Staff, or any officer of Assistant commissioner rank or above in the Metropolitan Police Service.

Blackouts — Media

On rare occasions, forces may request voluntary media blackouts in relation to the broadcasting or publication of sensitive information. This should only be done where it can be demonstrated that the dissemination of this information would result in harm to individuals or prevent the arrest of a suspected perpetrator. The media should be allowed to film or be briefed on developments but requested not to broadcast the material until it is safe to do so, similar to arrangements under the Kidnap Protocol. This was applied successfully in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings during a planned operation to arrest two individuals. All the media adhered to the request.

Casualty Bureau

It is not sufficient to publicise the number of the Casualty Bureau in isolation. Members of the public need to know when it is appropriate to use the number.

Wherever possible, key messages should include how to determine the likelihood of an individual being at risk of being a victim of the incident prior to making a call which may be unnecessary.

CCTV

Footage of the scene may be available. It would be necessary to obtain permission from the Gold Commander, SIO and owner of the CCTV footage (e.g. business/council) before issuing it.

Images may be available from the Force Air Support Unit.

For mobile phone footage, see **Mobile phone images** listed under this section.

Consequences Management

In major incidents and operations, including counter-terrorism operations, see **section 2** of this document - **Guidance on media handling at a terrorism incident**, a Consequences Management group or cell will be set up in order to assess the outcome of the incident or operation on the community.

This group, which may be multi-agency and often involves members of independent advisory groups (IAGs), will assess the situation and what can be done to deal with any issues which arise. This could range from problems with power supplies to community tensions, attacks on specific groups of people and/or risks to food supplies or individuals.

Communications and media relations are key tools in identifying issues and finding ways to communicate in order to assist in dealing with them and should always be included in this group.

Contact Details

Contact details for all of the Force's communications professionals should be maintained on an up-to-date database and/or in paper form for use in a major incident.

It would be good practice for contacts for partner agencies to be accessible and up-to-date.

Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs)

There are four Counter Terrorism Units set up by ACPO TAM across the country – Greater Manchester Police, Metropolitan Police, West Midlands Police and West Yorkshire Police. See **Section 2 Guidance on Media Handling at a Terrorism Incident** for further information on the role of the CTU.

Debriefs

A 'hot' debrief should be held immediately following any incident. Issues should be recorded and consideration given to what learning can be agreed or measures put in place to deal with any problems on future occasions.

Force-wide longer-term debriefs must always include communications and media issues.

Disclosure

All activity must be logged — both policy decisions and actions. All material is potentially disclosable in the event of any subsequent prosecution, investigation or inquiry. This should be considered when decisions are made about the release of information to the media, public or other stakeholders. See **Logging** under this section.

Diversity Issues

Diverse communities can be affected in different ways by a major incident. Where an incident occurs which could have an impact on race, gender, religion or sexuality, early links should be made with diversity command in the Force and/or Independent Advisory Groups. Also see **ACPO National Community Tension Team Guidance on Use of Language** at Appendix (vii)

Where an incident occurs which could have an international impact, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) should be made aware.

Evaluation

Evaluation methods and criteria should be included in any media and communications strategy in order to assess for effectiveness. Any media and communications strategy should be continually reviewed during the course of an incident, operation or investigation as the objectives and key messages may change.

Exercises and Sharing Good Practice

While exercises can sometimes be somewhat inadequate in testing media relations and communications, as it is difficult to simulate the amount of pressure and media interest in a genuine incident, they are useful for sharing good practice, learning and involving partners.

It is recommended that members of the media, engaged through the national and regional emergency forums, be involved in discussions about emergency plans and, where possible, tabletop or other exercises where issues can be raised in advance of any incident occurring.

Gold Group Strategy

A suggested template for membership of the **Gold Communications Group, Terms of Reference** and agenda for meetings is attached at Appendix (ii).

Government Role (including the role of the News Co-ordination Centre)

In the event of a major incident, particularly where it involves allegations of terrorism activity, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) would be set up, which could be chaired by the Prime Minister or Home Secretary and is likely to include the Military Commander and other senior Government advisors. A Government Liaison Team (GLT) led by two senior officials from the Home Office would be sent to Gold Control to provide advice to Gold and her/his team.

It should be remembered that it is the police incident commander who has command of the incident and with whom decisions about media and communications should be agreed. While Government officials may decide to comment on media handling and communications, it is the decision of the Force in whose area the incident has occurred with regard to which strategy and actions are implemented.

For events that are likely to impact on a range of Government departments including major incidents or protracted incidents like foot and mouth, the Cabinet Office News Co-ordination Centre may be established. This is a flexible media operation that can be scaled up or down depending on the nature or the severity of the event to support central Government and other agencies.

The NCC can undertake a variety of roles from co-ordinating information; preparing and co-ordinating lines to take; co-ordinating facility requests with Government Ministers; website co-ordination and/or the provision of full press office services.

Early contact with the NCC is advisable as they can support Forces in their engagement with Government departments and other organisations. A representative from the NCC will also sit

in COBRA and is a useful contact to share information on media and communication issues with.

The NCC can be contacted through Carol McCall on 0207 276 5104 or 07799581667 or e-mail carol.mccall@cabibet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk

Clearly, it is advantageous to work closely with the NCC or lead Government press team, other agencies and the media to co-ordinate messages and minimize public fear and panic.

Handovers

The most likely shift arrangement for any ongoing major incident is likely to be 12 hours on duty, 12 hours off duty. Appropriate arrangements must be made for handovers between Gold, Silver and Bronze coordinators. See also Logistics **Manager Bronze** in Section 1.

Health and Safety

Each media or communications professional required to attend the scene of an incident should only do so after a thorough risk assessment. They should be provided with relevant health and safety equipment, e.g. body armour, hard hats, high visibility tabards, etc. Where a risk assessment indicates that protective equipment is required before attending the scene of an incident, serious consideration should be given as to whether it is appropriate for a police or other press officer to attend. Decisions should be logged along with the basis on which they were made. The safety of staff is paramount when considering these issues. Appropriate training in health and safety should have been provided, e.g. briefings on how to ensure protection from any unpredicted gunfire, etc. It is good practice to conduct any risk assessment in liaison with an operational officer or commander at the scene.

Forces are not responsible for risk assessments on behalf of the media. That is each organisation's own responsibility. However, as much information as possible about the nature of any threat which might affect health and safety should be passed on to the media as early as possible.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) Communication Strategy

The term '**Family Assistance Centre**' should not be used as it is misleading to the public, who do not need to be members of victims' families to seek assistance.

The responsibility for managing the Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) rests with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). However, local police press officers may be asked to support the media handling operation, particularly in the early stages.

Significant media attention is likely to occur with regard to the HAC — both onsite and offsite. The last HAC deployment attracted over 100 different foreign media agencies on any given day in the initial response phase.

It is suggested that there is a lead designated press officer from the lead agency on-site at all times to co-ordinate media activity. This person should be supported by press officers from the other partner agencies.

It is not appropriate to expect emergency services staff or other non-media trained agency personnel to manage media expectation onsite, as well as undertaking their own

responsibilities.

An example of a proactive HAC communications strategy is at Appendix (iv). An initial HAC set-up plan is available to read at Appendix (iii).

Initial Actions

Initial actions in the event of a major incident should include:

- Appointment of a Force spokesperson at a suitable level in the organisation
- Issuing of a holding statement as early as possible and certainly within 20 minutes of a major incident being declared - see **possible template** at Appendix (v).
- Appointment of Gold, Silver and Bronze media and communications commanders - see **Corporate Communication roles and responsibilities** at Appendix (1).

Initial Information

Initial information which can be given, with the approval of the Gold Commander could include:

- Confirm that an incident has taken place
- Confirm whether area has been sealed off or cleared
- Confirm evacuations
- Traffic diversions, information about public transport etc
- Reassurance to the community that emergency services are in attendance and dealing with the situation
- Confirm whether there have been casualties — **not** numbers or seriousness/nature of casualties at an early stage to avoid potentially inaccurate information being released
- Telephone number of Casualty Bureau, if available

NB Do not overreact

See information which can be given as part of an initial holding statement template at Appendix v.

Inter-agency Liaison

Liaison with other agencies and partners is important if media and communications activity is to be consistent and co-ordinated.

A range of people/organisations should be considered, as appropriate, for inclusion in a Gold Group or other communications coordination group. A potential list of these can be found in the **Gold Communications Group Template** at Appendix (ii).

All partner agencies should be reminded to:

- only comment on their specific area of expertise;
- share press lines with each other;
- retain confidentiality where appropriate; and
- not comment on the wider incident where it falls outside of their remit.

It is good practice to provide accommodation for this group, if possible separate from but adjacent to the main police press office accommodation. While communications professionals from other agencies will have their own laptop equipment, they will need telephones, power points and other facilities on an ongoing basis.

IPCC Investigations

Where these are active in relation to the incident, the IPCC protocol should be followed (currently being updated).

Lead Forces

In an incident which crosses Force boundaries, a lead Force should be appointed to co-ordinate media and communications issues. Their role is to:

- prepare and disseminate an initial holding statement, including to other Forces involved;
- develop media and communications strategy, and consult and liaise with other Forces in order to agree the strategy. This should include the parameters of activity individual Forces can undertake and arrangements for information-sharing. The strategy should include briefing times, proposed or draft statements and key contact numbers (including out of hours);
- co-ordinate media activity and media monitoring in liaison with other Forces and agencies; and
- keep all stakeholders informed of what is taking place.

It is important to note that while there will be a central media handling plan some local issues will need to be picked up by the relevant force. For example, the impact of a search or arrest on a location or the media at a scene should first be handled by that force. However, the information that is provided should be forwarded to the co-ordinating force press office. The aim is to have a coordinated media strategy but to take cognisance of the need to respond to local issues. Media monitoring must be shared between all press offices involved and all contacts should be made aware of any emerging issues. The addresses of major operations will be requested by the media and there is no general reason to withhold this. However, care should be taken to ensure there is no impact on the operation by the release of this information. All relevant SIOs in each force should be alerted to the release of the information through the consequence management or investigation team.

Local Plans

Many Forces will have localised alert systems or planning structures or arrangements, which cater for local circumstances. E.g. London Resilience First Alert, Scottish Executive involvement etc. These should be reflected in local plans.

Logging

Logging of information is vital if an audit trail is to be maintained. In particular, systems should be in place to record policy and any changes to policy, along with the rationale behind any changes. This record will be vital during and after the incident and in the event of future reviews or public inquiries. See Disclosure in this section.

Media Briefing Centre

It would be good practice to identify possible media briefing centre locations in advance of any incident occurring, although clearly the nature and location of any incident will affect a decision in this regard. Remember that a cordon may be established for some kilometers around the centre of an incident, which may affect the choice of location for the media briefing centre.

Media Monitoring

All news broadcasts should be monitored, particularly those from 24/7 news channels such as BBC News 24, Sky and Radio 5 live. Local radio, print and television outlets should also be monitored, particularly as these may have more localised sources of information and their coverage may set a wider news agenda.

Internet sites should, as far as possible, be reviewed regularly, particularly any with direct relevance to the incident.

Media coverage should be recorded in brief and distributed to the Gold Media and Communications Officer and to other stakeholders and partners.

It is worth considering that other Forces may be able to assist you with media monitoring, as may the Government News Network.

A media logging database is useful to log coverage and its broad contents.

Media monitoring can be resource-intensive, especially on a real-time basis. It is likely that a minimum of 2 people per shift will be needed to monitor key broadcasts and websites, plus print media. In reality, as many as 4 people per shift may be required. It may be worth considering pre-briefing or training administrative or other staff to undertake this role.

Mobile Phone Images

Mobile telephony provides a whole new opportunity and challenge for policing organisations. Media organisations have access to images of incidents from people's mobile phones minutes after an event has occurred. This can create fear among the public and needs close monitoring.

Equally, there is a potential for intelligence to be generated from these images. Forces should seek to find a way of encouraging the public to forward them to police investigation teams, possibly via the Internet using intelligence forms. These should be designed prior to any incident in liaison with Crime Departments in order to provide a valid audit trail at the time of any incident.

During a major incident, mobile phones may cease to work, so it is good practice **to** consider alternatives. See also **Technical Communications** under this section.

Overseas Incidents

A joint protocol between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Metropolitan Police Service and Association of Chief Police Officers was drawn up following the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004. It lays out the action to be taken in the event of a major disaster or terrorism act overseas. Any UK Force can be allocated the lead in respect of an incident of this type. Communications professionals should make themselves aware of the contents of this protocol. Contact ACPO Press Office for a copy of the document.

Photographers

It is the job of media photographers to get images which show the incident or event. Unless this genuinely impedes operational policing, prevents other emergency services personnel from dealing with the incident, is in genuine danger of jeopardizing an investigation or puts them or others at risk of harm, they have a right to do this.

Photographers should be allowed to carry on with their activities as far as is practicable and it is not the job of the police to prevent them from fulfilling their role.

A document called **Guidelines for Staff Dealing with Media Reporters, Press Photographers and Television Crews** has been produced by the Metropolitan Police and is available at Appendix (vi)

Any incidents where photography is an issue should be reported directly to the Force's Press Office.

Police Footage of Incidents

Consideration could be given to releasing appropriate police footage to the media. Where this is considered the views of the SIO must be sought prior to release.

Where in-house photographic staff are to be used, e.g. to produce footage of an incident scene, an appropriate risk assessment must be undertaken.

Remember that all the footage will be disclosable in the event of any future prosecution. See Disclosure in this section.

Pooling Arrangements

If there is a need to hold pooled media facilities, the media should be allowed to decide who will undertake this pool. If they fail to agree, the Force will select broadcast, radio and print outlets to undertake the pool. The following conditions must be agreed to by the organisations chosen:

- interviews must be conducted by trained journalists;
- interviews must be done on broadcast quality equipment;
- interviews must be done as 'stand alone' pieces, without reporters, logos etc in shot, so that they can be used by any organisation. No journalist or media organisation should gain any editorial advantage through undertaking a pool;
- whoever undertakes to conduct the pool must also take responsibility for pooling the material to other organisations;

- interviews/photographs must be copied and made available to other organisations before any editing is done;
- broadcasters must do everything reasonable to ensure copied pool tapes are distributed asap. This must be within a maximum of two hours of the pool being completed; and
- Photographs must be made available to all other organisations, as soon as possible and prior to commercial syndication or distribution.

Post-Event Activity

An essential part of dealing with any major incident is the continuous reassurance of the public, both while the incident is ongoing and to assist the so-called 'return to normality'. See template for **Counter Terrorism Community Engagement Strategy** at Appendix (viii) on reassurance for suggested strategic and tactical approaches to this.

Reassurance

Community reassurance is vital in the event of a major incident. Community tensions can be high, as well as increased fear among the community and/or particular sections of the community.

A community impact statement should always be undertaken in order to assess the potential impact of the incident, investigation and/or media and communications issues on communities. For example, the alleged plot to bomb trans-Atlantic aircraft prompted an impact assessment in relation to people who were traveling by air or planning to travel by air; and in the case of Terrorism Act related arrests or operations, a community impact assessment based on the locality and background of the local community is always carried out. While these are usually undertaken by the officer in charge of the operation, they can be generated by Communications or Media Officers and, in any case, should always involve a media and communications assessment. It would be good practice to make yourself aware of your Force's methods of Community Impact Assessment.

In addition, Forces liaise with the ACPO National Community Tension Team (NCTT) in order to share information about community impact and assess community tensions across the UK. Each Force has a single point of contact (SPOC) who has this role.

The Counter Terrorism Community Engagement Strategy at Appendix (vii) can be used or adapted for use generically in major incidents and/or used for terrorism related incidents.

Rendezvous Point — Media

A media RVP should be identified as soon as possible after a major incident is declared, bearing in mind the appropriate risk assessments for police staff and the implementation of cordons.

Resilience

Due to the size of many corporate communications functions, resourcing major incidents and counter terrorism work is challenging and problematic. Developing rotas must ensure

that the most experienced staff are available at key times and should call upon skills from other sections to ease the pressure. For example, web officers may be asked to keep the website up to date. Most critical is to ensure there is management resilience by developing a suitable shift pattern.

Mutual aid should be considered at an early stage and requested, either via the ACPO PNICC (Police National Information Coordination Centre), the ACPO Communications office or as set out in local force policy.

See also **Logistics Manager (Bronze)** in main text of **Section 1** and **Media Monitoring** in this **A-Z section**.

Speculation

There is a need to consider and decide how best to deal with media speculation. Wherever possible, it should be corrected. However, this may not always be possible for operational or investigative reasons. Decisions about the actions to be taken in relation to speculation should be recorded on a policy log. See also Logging.

Spokespeople

A clear decision must be made about who are the appropriate spokespeople and for what aspects of the operation/incident.

The main Force spokesperson would usually be expected to be of ACPO rank in the event of a major incident. Where someone is nominated as a spokesperson, this should be their sole responsibility as it is likely to be extremely time-consuming.

In a 24/7 incident, it is good practice to provide two spokespeople, one for day shifts and one for night shifts.

Technical Communications

Forces should recognise that IT support for media and communications activity in the case of a major incident is critical to success in managing that incident. It should therefore be prioritised in the event of a major incident being declared. IT facilities must include:

- appropriate and sufficient telephones (landline and mobiles) for the use of the communications team;
- access to Internet and Intranet, including content management systems;
- electronic logging facilities;
- media monitoring equipment, including recording facility;
- word processing equipment;
- fax machine;
- access to police radios should be considered and, if possible, provided as quickly as possible; and
- access to Force computer systems to view ongoing operational activity and input media statements.

Telephones, landlines and mobiles can be unreliable in the case of a major incident.

It would be good practice to allow key members of the communications team access to

Airwave radios in order to facilitate communication. However, this means that training must be taken out in advance of any incident occurring. It would also be good practice to have a limited number of pooled radios for immediate use in the event of a major event or incident.

The ability to install ACCOLC (ACCess Overload Control) on the telephones of personnel should also be considered and, where practicable, undertaken on Press Officers' telephones. ACCOLC is a management facility which enables access to the mobile telephone networks to be restricted to those essential users who have a public safety role at the scene of an incident, i.e. Category One Responders (for the full list of responders see **Category One Responders** in main text in **Section 1**). Registered users are provided with an ACCOLC enabled Sim card. This facility has limited availability. Most Forces coordinate this via their Emergency Planning Departments.

It is worth bearing in mind that there could be difficulties accessing computer systems or reaching headquarters buildings. It would be good practice to set up a Hotmail account and make the details available to staff in order to be able to access emails on a short-term basis should this be the case.

Templates

Templates are attached at Appendices (i) and (ii) which could form the basis of a definition of roles and an initial media and communications strategy.

Vantage Points - Media

The media will always been keen to get pictures from the scenes of incidents - see also Photographers in this section. The longer they are kept waiting, the more frustrated they will become and the more risk there could potentially be to the operational and investigative management of the incident . To assist them, all possible ways of facilitating or providing visual material should be positively considered.

Technology can enable the media to get photographs or film of a scene from some distance away. In the early stages of an incident, media may seek out high buildings from where they can obtain images. It may be advantageous if a suitable building — outside any exclusion zone — where they can base themselves can be identified. See also Media Briefing Centre in this section.

SECTION 2

GOOD PRACTICE/MEDIA HANDLING AND COMMUNICATIONS AT A COUNTER TERRORISM INCIDENT

Terrorism-Related Incidents

Terrorism presents a range of challenges to the police service and its partners, particularly in managing major incidents, operations and investigations. In addition to the generic guidance relating to major incidents, there are a number of specific elements involved in managing terrorist incidents. As communications in relation to operations and investigations are closely linked to dealing with incidents as and when they occur, this section of the guidance includes references to best practice in handling these and associated issues.

The communications and media handling is a vital part of any counter terrorism operation. A successful operation can be won or lost in the public's mind through the media handling and stakeholder communications. The media messages play a huge role in shaping the public view of an operation. Media handling and communications also sit alongside the consequences management work that considers the impact of activity on specific communities.

This document brings together the current good practice that has been developed and will continue to be developed as issues of good practice are identified within future operations. It also highlights the recommended use of language in relation to counter terrorism incidents - see ACPO National Community Tension Team **Guidance on Use of Language to Engage Communities in Relation to Counter Terrorism** at Appendix (vii).

Counter Terrorism Units

There are four Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) set up across the country —

- Greater Manchester Police
- Metropolitan Police Service
- West Midlands Police
- West Yorkshire Police

Their roles include:

- Gathering intelligence;
- Liaison with the Security Service;
- Planning and carrying out terrorism-related operations;
- Investigations;
- Trials;
- Consequences management, such as working with locally-based officers to assess and manage community tensions; and
- Media relations and communications in relation to CT issues.

These specialist units provide assistance to other Forces when dealing with counter terrorism issues.

Communications officers from any of the above Forces are available to advise if another Force requests assistance in relation to handling media and communications activity surrounding counter terrorism issues.

General Messages

Messages which should be included wherever possible in statements and interviews should include:

- Primary objective is to protect the public from harm;
- Public should remain vigilant and report anything suspicious to police via **999**;
- Communities defeat terrorism;
- We will only catch these criminals/prevent future attacks with the help of the public;
- Crime prevention (role of security managers, CCTV etc); and
- Anti-Terrorist Hotline — 0800 789321.

NB Be confident and reassure.

COUNTER TERRORISM INCIDENT MEDIA HANDLING - A-Z OF GOOD

PRACTICE

The following is an alphabetical list of issues in which good practice has been developed and/or identified. This list is not exhaustive and it is proposed to update this guidance annually based on any new experience, knowledge or developments.

ACPO TAM

The ACPO business area with responsibility for counter-terrorism is Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM), usually chaired by the post holder of the MPS Assistant Commissioner Special Operations. ACPO TAM leads on national counter-terrorism policing policy and its chair, along with the ACPO President, may act as a spokesman on national policy when appropriate. ACPO TAM also appoints a Communications Coordinator, based in the ACPO Press Office, part of whose role it is to ensure coordination between press officers working on counter-terrorism issues in forces and in CTUs. Along with the **Metropolitan Police Service Specialist Operations Press Desk** (see entry in this section), the ACPO TAM Communications Coordinator can and will provide support in the event of a terrorist incident.

ACPO PNIICC

The ACPO Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNIICC) can be activated to supply mutual aid and coordinate national response in the event of a terrorist incident (see detailed entry in early section).

Bail

There is no provision under the Terrorism Act to bail people who have been arrested. It is often necessary to explain this to the media, particularly where they assume that because an individual has been released, there is nothing to justify police actions in making an arrest initially. However, this needs to be handled extremely sensitively. It would be good practice to explain this in general terms prior to any arrests taking place, possibly in a media consultation event or Regional Emergency Forum environment.

Charges

It is good practice to give full details of any charges made against individuals charged under the Terrorism Act. This makes clear to the media and the public the exact nature of the allegations.

Media statements regarding the outcome of arrests must be carefully worded and it is important to state that the legislation does not allow release on bail (see **Legislation** in this section).

Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents

An incident involving the release of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) substances will obviously attract considerable media interest. Where the act is of a deliberate nature by a terrorism group, world-wide media interest can be anticipated.

Because of the hazards involved, media handling is likely to be different from any conventional major incident. Therefore early media management is vital.

In addition to the generic guidance, there are several other communication areas which need to be covered in relation to CBRN incidents.

- A preliminary statement should confirm that police are responding to an incident/explosion and/or that a suspect package/car/building etc is being checked;
- early release of information about evacuation and traffic issues is particularly important;
- confirmation at an appropriate point — after consultation with SO 15, and Gold Commander — that the package may contain hazardous material;
- ensure that the public information messages are given to PA, the BBC and news desks for the broadcast media and that they are asked to broadcast the message as soon as possible. This must include details of actions for the public to take in order to protect themselves from harm; and
- email For Offer statement to police staff and other partners' organisations to ensure they are fully informed.

Whatever the circumstances, press officers must not be sent to the scene without the authority of the Gold (Media and Communications).

Because of the risk of contamination, press activity at the scene may be severely restricted. Forces are not responsible for risk assessments on behalf of the media. That is their own organisation's responsibility. However, as much information as possible and appropriate about the nature of any threat which might affect health and safety should be passed on to the media as early as possible.

Community Links

Liaison with Independent Advisory Group (IAG) members (or an individual member who can identify with a particular section of the community) works well. It is worth considering briefing local MPs or councilors at an appropriate time to ensure that an accurate picture of the situation emerges within the community.

In addition, IAG members can be useful in identifying issues which can be particularly sensitive in a community and/or phraseology which might assist in explaining the situation in a more responsive or accurate manner.

Control Orders

Nothing can be said which might identify people who may be the subject of control orders as the legislation contains clauses guaranteeing the anonymity of the individuals involved.

Any general questions about control orders should be referred to the Home Office press office.

Critical Incidents

Many of these types of incidents, operations or investigations could also be classified as critical incidents. Even where this is not formally established, there is always the capacity for the situation to develop in this way and it is therefore considered to be good practice to deal with the communications and media issues as Forces would under similar critical circumstances.

Detention of Suspects

The detention of terrorist suspects is always of interest to the media. It is important to continue to monitor the investigation in the days when a suspect may be in detention. Issues can continue to arise while in custody, for example, refusing food or making some kind of protest. It is also possible that the legal representative may make some contact or statement with the media on behalf of their client.

Early Involvement of Communications and Media Staff

While it is accepted that counter terrorism-related incidents, operations and investigations are often dealt with on a need-to-know basis, it is good practice to involve media handling and communications staff at as early a stage as possible in order to effectively manage media and communications issues. See item on **Vetting** in this section. There are numerous examples of occasions where this advance planning has assisted in effectively managing potentially damaging media coverage. Equally, there are examples of where Forces have been prevented from undertaking proactive media management activity and where coverage has been negative and filled with unhelpful speculation as a result.

It should be remembered that it is the Officer in Command in the Force or lead Force concerned who has the overall responsibility for media and communications activity, not other organisations or individuals.

Ethnicity

See section on Information about suspects, people arrested or charged.

Evacuation plans

All local authorities are bound by the Civil Contingencies Act to have evacuation plans for city centres. Police communications professionals must be aware of these plans and offer assistance, where necessary, to local authorities in implementing the communications aspects of them.

Health Issues

It may be useful to develop protocols and working relationships with hospitals and health

authorities or trusts prior to any incident, operation or investigation taking place. This is true where the public may be admitted to hospital but is particularly important where a suspected criminal or suspected terrorist may be admitted to hospital. Be aware that it is possible that people who are arrested may require medical treatment, e.g. for injuries, ongoing medical conditions or in relation to hunger strikes.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC)

See Guidance on Setting up a Humanitarian Assistance Centre at Appendix (iii) and **HAC** in the **A-Z of Good Practice in Section 1**.

Identification of Officers and Staff

The media should be reminded not to identify counter terrorism or covert officers working at the scene of incidents.

Information about Suspects, People Arrested or Charged

Identifying the ethnic or religious background to a person who is being sought in connection with a terrorism-related investigation can have a disproportionate impact on members of particular communities, either in the UK or overseas. This can be true even when the police are merely confirming what the media already know as the UK police service is perceived as an authoritative source of information.

Be aware that it is often difficult to establish the background of some individuals with complete accuracy. However, the general principle should be not to be involved in stating or confirming someone's ethnic or religious background unless there is a justifiable reason for doing so, which must be logged.

The addresses of major operations will be requested by the media and there is no general reason to withhold this, although each case should be considered on its merits and the risk involved, for example, if a family remains at the address, should be assessed.

Internet

Counter terrorism operations often have international connections, and this inevitably leads to interest from international media outlets. It is incredibly difficult to facilitate all the media enquiries that are received during the initial stages of a counter terrorism operation or incident. It is therefore, essential to utilise the police website to provide the latest information on an operation.

If information is kept up-to-date on the website and the accuracy is proven, then it can become the first point of contact for the media, which improves the efficiency of the press office in answering media calls.

Issuing Information — Proactive or Reactive?

An early decision should be made on whether (or what) information should be offered proactively to the media and community and what should be kept on an If Asked or For Guidance basis. The strategy should be developed in line with operational, investigative

and consequences management strategies.

See Information which can be given as part of an initial holding statement at Appendix (v).

Knowledge

It is vital to ensure that Corporate Communications and media professionals are kept up-to-date with developments, relevant background material etc as the incident, operation or investigation develops.

In addition, it may be helpful to explain to the media the types of tactics used to undertake counter terrorism investigations, e.g. unarmed entry, risk assessments etc.

Language

Counter terrorism communication is a very sensitive area. It is important to engage effectively with local communities, and adopt clear and straight forward language which avoids implying that specific communities are to blame. See **ACPO National Community Tension Team Guidance on Use of Language to Engage Communities in Relation to Counter Terrorism** at appendix (vii).

Lead Forces

In the case of cross-border operations or incidents, overall coordination is clearly a crucial part of maintaining a professional and consistent approach, particularly in relation to dealing with the media. One Force will usually be nominated as the lead Force. Their role will be to produce an overall media relations and communications strategy, in liaison with other forces, coordinate communications activity and evaluate/debrief media coverage and communications. This in no way affects the autonomy of individual forces to conduct their own media relations and communications activity.

Legislation

It is increasingly evident that many journalists, particularly local journalists, have a limited level of knowledge of relevant legislation. It would be good practice to seek to share this knowledge with journalists in order to prevent problems during major or critical incidents.

It is also important to ensure that Press Officers and others working on these incidents, operations and investigations are fully briefed about the legislation.

Media Handling Options

There a wide range of methods that can be used to provide information to the media. In major operations a media briefing may be the most effective and efficient way to share the information. However, the media will have lots of questions about the status of the investigation, the source of intelligence and the links to other investigations. It can therefore be beneficial to provide an off-the-record overview of the situation, including what can be said and covering aspects of the investigation that police will not be able to discuss. This must be tightly controlled and recorded. When the spokesperson ends up on camera, this enables the Force to manage the questioning in a better way, ensuring that it

remains in the areas that police can confidently discuss. In cases that may be even more sensitive, an agreed statement can be 'voiced' by the spokesperson. This means the media are alerted to the fact that there will be no further information provided, but they are able to obtain video and audio clips to use to illustrate the operation. It is important to remember to check media accreditation and take the details of all those who attend any media briefings.

See The UK **Press Card** at Appendix (vi).

In some cases the media can be brought in ahead of an action being taken. This is usually best handled on the basis of working with one media organisation to explore some of the work that takes place behind the scenes. This can assist communities in understanding the planning that police do before any operation, and how community impact is considered. In some instances, it may be beneficial to work with a media organisation that covers a specific geographic area, or that covers a key ethnic group. This needs to be carefully handled and have the full support of the Gold Commander and the Sb. The media organisation involved need to be fully aware of their obligations in relation to security and integrity around the operation. If this is handled in the right way, the exclusive package produced can help to set the tone for all other media reporting. However, it is important to remember that this can be open to criticism from media who are not offered this level of access. It is therefore essential to document why this particular course of action is taken and why the particular media organisation is chosen — see **Logging** in **Section 1 A — Z**. In the long term, care should be taken to ensure that other media organisations have an opportunity to have such access immediately ahead of an operation. This would not be suitable in the case of a major incident where the primary objective is to get information across to the public by dealing with the media in an equitable way.

Media Strategies

It is good practice to establish a 'library' of media strategies linked to counter terrorism, which can be called upon or adapted in order to deal with situations as they arise.

Minority Media

It is good practice to work with locally-based minority and/or community media outlets to educate them and their readers in relation to the challenges faced by the police service in tackling terrorism.

It is also useful to explain what is done with regard to considering the effects on different communities of counter-terrorism activity and explain the steps taken to ensure that police action is fair and proportionate. See **Template for Counter Terrorism Community Engagement Strategy** at Appendix (viii).

Paid for Publicity/Health Information

In the event of an incident of a terrorist or CBRN-related nature, there may be a need to issue public safety and health information. This should be done in liaison with the Department of Health, Home Office, Scottish or Welsh Executive and/or Civil Contingencies Secretariat from the Cabinet Office as well as in liaison with local councils and health agencies. This might include leaflets outlining the effects of contamination, where to get health screens etc. It may also be necessary to buy media space or sites at short notice to publicise health and safety messages, including TV and radio slots. Remember that the BBC, as a public broadcast outlet, has plans for disseminating this type of information via

radio and television if requested to do so. See BBC Connecting in a Crisis website <http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis/index.shtml>

Partnerships

The impact of counter terrorism operations can be extensive and partner organisations should be alerted to any visible police activity that is likely to spark media interest. This should be done at the earliest opportunity. An early explanation or briefing about what has taken place and the details of the media lines being provided will allow the organisation to prepare for any possible media enquiries they may receive. This liaison must continue whenever anything new or significant occurs, or is likely to reach the media. It may assist to create an email group to reach the key individuals. At the time of any activity the relevant local authority press lead should be alerted together with interest groups such as the Crown Prosecution Service, police authority or immigration service. See also **Inter-Agency Liaison in A-Z of Section 1**.

Pre-Planned Counter Terrorism Operations

Media and communications, including community impact and reassurance, must be considered as part of the pre-planning for any counter terrorism operation. Bear in mind that while proactive media activity may quite legitimately not be part of the operational strategy, there is always a risk of the community and/or media becoming aware of the operation, either before, during or after it is carried out. Plans should be in place to deal with this.

Questions and Answers

There are many standard questions that are asked by the media when any counter terrorism operation takes place. These include queries about what threat the individuals posed to the community, UK and abroad, and whether they had links to any other known terrorist groups. Before any operation takes place a list of possible media questions and the relevant answers should be developed. Even if the answer is 'not prepared to discuss' it should be documented. Some potential areas for discussion include the readiness to handle any terrorist attack, and the emergency procedures that are in place. The answers to these questions can be prepared and stored for use 'off the shelf'. A comprehensive series of questions and answers will assist all the press office staff when they are dealing with media calls.

Recognition of the Importance of Media Management

It is vital that the officers in command and investigating officers recognise and understand the importance of media handling in counter terrorism operations. If the press office is to produce an effective media handling strategy they require access to as much information as possible. The important role of the media can be effectively demonstrated through joint training exercises. It is also essential to have worked with key officers to ensure they understand the role of the press office, and also to ensure that press officers have a level of general knowledge about the work of counter terrorism officers.

Resilience

The length of any incident, operation or investigation can make resilience an issue for any Force, particularly where vetted staff are required. See reference to **Resilience** in **Section 1** and **Vetting** in this section.

Spokespeople

Spokespeople should be selected according to their relevant area of expertise in line with media and communications Gold strategy but care should be taken not to confuse the public by using too many 'talking-heads'.

Spokespeople could include any of the following:

- **Chair ACPO TAM** — national or international terrorism-related issues;
- **Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Metropolitan Police Service** —national or international terrorism-related issues, major Metropolitan-police led operations and investigations;
- **ACPO President** — policy and Police Service comment on terrorism issues;
- **Operational spokesperson** - dedicated officer, often at ACPO level but could also be from Special Branch, Counter Terrorism Unit or Major Investigation Team, as appropriate;
- **Reassurance / community spokesperson** - to deal with reassurance issues and the 'return to normality' — probably locally, Divisional or BCU based; and
- **Investigation spokesperson** — to fit with development of media and communications strategy into the investigative stage of the incident.

Specialist Operations Press Desk (Metropolitan Police Service)

It is good practice to liaise with the Metropolitan Police's Specialist Operations Press Desk in relation to media and communications activity supporting operations, incidents and investigations. They can and will provide valuable support and advice in relation to media handling and other related issues. Communications officers from other Forces with CTUs also have experience in dealing with media and communications for terrorism-related issues and may be willing to assist, where appropriate. Responsibility for media and communications rests, however, with the lead Force and/or other Forces involved in relation to community and local reassurance. See **Lead Force** in this section.

Terminology

Terrorists are criminals. It is essential to avoid potentially glamorising or dignifying the terrorist and their criminal activity through the inappropriate use of paramilitary language and descriptions such as 'innocent victims' and 'active service units'.

Do not criminalise a specific community or culture. Do not use language such as 'Islamic' which is open to various interpretations and could contribute to inflaming community tension. See the **ACPO National Community Tension Team Guidance on Use of Language to Engage Communities in Relation to Counter Terrorism** at appendix (vii).

Timing of release of information

The timing of the release of information to the media and public is critical and a detailed plan of action should be included in any communications and media strategy.

Vetting

Staff in key communications posts should have enhanced vetting. This may be contained to the Head of Corporate Communications, their Deputy and the head of press office and deputy. See section on **Vetting** in main guidance. This additional vetting provides officers with a level of confidence to be able to disclose more information to those staff, while maintaining a need-to-know approach. Whether the vetting should be to the Developed Vetting level is a matter for individual forces.

Victim/Witness Family Support

There are some key groups of people who can have an impact on the media management. These include victims, their families, witnesses, those arrested and their families. Measures need to be put in place operationally to support individuals affected by warrants or activity, which can be through the consequence management group. This can be something to positively explain to the media to avoid some criticism. Advice should also be provided to individuals, where appropriate, on how to handle the media, particularly in the return to normality.

Appendix (i)

CORPORATE COMMUNICATION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

It should be noted that Forces may have different names for particular roles; that some Forces use PIVOT and others do not; that smaller Forces may not have the capacity to provide named individuals for each of the roles; and that other Forces may decide to introduce additional or more specialised roles depending on the nature of any particular incident. The key point of these role descriptions is that they aim to cover the critical functions which must be carried out if effective media and communications strategies are to be delivered in the case of a major incident and provide guidance and possible templates for the development of bespoke roles in each Force.

Gold Communications Roles

Gold (Communications and Media)

The nature and location **of the incident will** dictate who is the GOLD Communications Officer, although this would usually **be** the Director/Deputy Director or Head of Department. The designated GOLD Communications Officer should:

- Attend Gold strategy meetings
- Set the Communication Strategy for dealing with the incident in agreement with the Gold Commander
- In consultation with Police GOLD, identify suitable media spokespeople
- Task SILVER press officer/communications officers/internal communications officers as appropriate
- Attend COBR meetings (if required/as appropriate)
- Organise liaison with partners' communications officers
- Ensure that partners are kept informed of communications and media activity, including establishing and Chairing meetings of the GOLD Communication Group
- Ensure that decisions and logs of actions taken or considered, rationale and timings are kept
- Ensure that appropriate staffing of the corporate communications functions is maintained, in liaison with the Logistics Officer
- Ensure that a holding statement is issued as soon as possible and that a flow of regular, accurate and up-to-date information is issued to the media and other stakeholders
- Ensure that media coverage is monitored and any issues reported to the Gold Group for discussion
- Ensure that any information or intelligence from the media is passed to the appropriate police officers or staff to assist in the handling of the incident and any

investigation

NB This role may be temporarily undertaken by the duty press officer or most senior Corporate Communications officer on duty at the initial time of the incident.

Silver Corporate Communications Roles

Silver (Media Liaison)

This role would usually be allocated to the Head of Press Office or his/her equivalent. S/he will:

- Ensure that tactics are delivered in order to achieve the Gold strategic objectives by implementing actions and decisions from the GOLD Communication Group meetings
- Support the Gold (Communications and Media)
- Attend any GOLD Group meetings (as appropriate and requested)
- Assist in identifying a media RVP at or close to the scene of the incident
- Assist in identifying a media briefing centre site
- Identify, manage and task Bronze (Media) officers at the scene, media briefing centre, Event Assistance Centre or elsewhere
- Be aware of all statements prior to them being released to ensure that they are consistent
- Monitor and provide details of media intelligence, information or coverage to the Gold (Communications and Media), including any speculation and inaccuracies
- Liaise with Silver (Community) with regard to consistency of messages
- Liaise with press officers from other agencies
- Complete appropriate risk assessments and keep them under constant review and if the situation changes take appropriate action to protect staff and make the media aware of any potential hazards

Silver (Community)

This role would usually be allocated to the Head of Public Relations or his/her equivalent and could also be allocated as a Bronze role, delegated to BCU-based PR or communications personnel if felt to be appropriate. They will:

- Identify appropriate communications tactics to reassure and inform members of affected communities directly in support of operational policing objectives and the 'return to normality'
- Ensure that actions are completed in support of the Gold Communications Strategy
- Report back to the Gold (Communications and Media) on community communications issues and communications activity

- Assist/support Police GOLD in arranging VIP visits and briefing Government Ministers

Bronze Corporate Communications Roles

Bronze (Media liaison — Scene)

Usually a press officer, they will:

- Co-ordinate media relations activity at or near to the scene of the incident
- Liaise with the operational Silver commander at the scene and assist in managing media activity, including consulting with him/her and the Bronze (Images) to arrange a suitable vantage point for broadcasters and photographers. If a vantage point is not possible, organise regular pooled media facilities
- Manage any media rendezvous point (RVP) established at the scene of an incident and assist in identifying a suitable site, if required, in liaison with the operational Silver Commander
- Ensure that details of the media RVP are distributed to the media via the Press Office
- Liaise with other emergency services press officers at the scene and discuss issues that may need clarification e.g. the number and type of casualties
- Organise briefing of the media at the RVP
- Arrange for the Police spokesperson to give preliminary interviews at the media RVP - ideally Police GOLD should be aware of the broad contents of information that will be given
- Assist in facilitating visits to the scene by dignitaries and politicians
- Liaise with the Bronze (Media Briefing Centre) as appropriate As the incident progresses, they should:
- Monitor the media RVP to ensure that journalists are kept informed of developments and identify issues/questions that need responses and inform Police SILVER and the Police Spokesperson
- Establish regular media updates with the designated Police Spokesperson — e.g. every 90/1 20 minutes
- Arrange pooled media facilities inside the disaster area after consultation with Police SILVER and the officer-in-charge of any criminal investigation
- Ensure continued liaison between all emergency service press officers

Bronze (Media Briefing Centre)

They will:

- Ensure that any media briefing centre required is set up and run efficiently and effectively
- Liaise with the Silver (Media) in order to ensure that communications strategies and tactics are delivered
- Collate media requests for information/interviews and so on made at the media centre and ensure that these are all logged and dealt with appropriately
- Make arrangements for media accreditation to be checked and attendance of the media at any facilities or interviews to be recorded and logged

Bronze (Crime)

It may be appropriate at some stage to identify a press officer who will handle the investigative side of any subsequent inquiry on a longer-term basis. If the incident is terrorism-related, the person identified will need to be vetted to Security Cleared standard as a minimum in order to be a part of the investigative team See Vetting under **A to Z in Section 2**.

They will

- Liaise with GOLD/SILVER Press Officers re media handling
- Handle all media issues in connection with the police investigation
- Attend any appropriate meetings concerned with the investigation
- Liaise with the Specialist Operations Press desk at the Metropolitan Police Service and/or other Forces, as required
- Prepare appropriate crime appeals
- Manage the preparation for the trial in terms of media and community communications, including any agreed pre-verdict briefings and post-trial media activity

Bronze (Inter-agency Liaison)

They will:

- Ensure that mechanisms are put in place to liaise with other agencies' press officers, e.g. distribution of press statements and releases by email, organisation of meetings and logging of decisions with regard to inter-agency liaison
- Log information sent out by other agencies
- Support media handling and communication activity at the Humanitarian Assistance Centre which will be coordinated by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport

Bronze (Media Monitoring)

This function may be carried out by a press officer or by administrative personnel.

They will:

- Ensure that relevant media coverage is monitored and recorded as far as practicable
- Produce a summary of key media items and their angles and log onto a database/Word document for the use of the Gold and Silver Communications commanders
- Liaise with suppliers of media monitoring, as appropriate, to get real-time information on media coverage and/or transcripts or copies of particular items.

NB This could include other Forces who could provide this service, such as the Metropolitan Police Service or Greater Manchester Police

Bronze (Internal Communications)

This is the role of the Internal Communications Manager, who will:

- Make sure that everyone within the Force is kept up to date with the latest, accurate information
- Update the Force Intranet site, which will include messages from Command and any information which is being disseminated to the media and/or the public
- Ensure that the Intranet site contains information for police officers and staff on what to do if they are approached by the media
- Ensure that other internal communications methods, such as the internal newspaper and/or email, are used to ensure effective dissemination of messages to all staff

Bronze (Communications Logistics)

In any protracted incident, the logistics of maintaining communications activity over a 24/7 period will be crucial. This would usually be the role of an Administrative Manager or senior administrative personnel. The Bronze (Communications Logistics) will:

- Ensure that appropriate business continuity is maintained, including any necessary relocation of resources to an alternative site
- Contact staff, as requested by the on-call press officer and/or Gold Commander to deal with the incident
- Complete staff shift rotas to cover 24/7 periods, ensuring that sufficient breaks are taken in line with the EEC Working Time Directive
- Liaise with other Forces and/or PNIICC, as required, to request and arrange mutual aid
- Ensure that all staff have appropriate breaks and refreshments

- Ensure that appropriate recording of hours worked takes place and is coded in a way which facilitates any potential reclaiming of expenditure
- Ensure that appropriate risk assessments are undertaken and that protective measures have been taken, where necessary. **NB This does not preclude the importance of individual line managers taking responsibility for their own safety and that of their staff.**

Bronze (e:Communications)

This role would normally be taken by the Force Web Manager or equivalent. S/he will:

- Ensure that the Internet is updated with all relevant public information, including ensuring that the home page is devoted entirely to the incident to assist the public in obtaining information easily
- Ensure that any intelligence, photographs etc obtained via the website are passed on to the investigation team or any other appropriate police personnel
- Liaise with the Silvers (Media and Communications) and the Casualty Bureau to ensure that all information which could be helpful to the public is publicised using the website. NB In certain circumstance, and only after the agreement of the Gold police commander, this could include the names of people who have died or have been injured.

Bronze (Images)

This would usually be undertaken by Force media photographers. They will:

- Liaise with the Bronze (Media — Scene) and Silver Commanders to establish a vantage point for the media as close as possible to the scene of the incident
- If the media are not granted access through the cordon, to liaise with the Silver Commander at the scene and obtain stills and/or footage which could be released to the media via the Press Office when approved by the Gold Commander/S 10
- Provide stills and moving footage to the Press Office for distribution to the media
- Where possible, to visually record press conferences and briefings, which may later be disclosable in the event of any court proceedings
- Ensure that the appropriate risk assessments are undertaken and that protective measures are taken

Appendix (ii)

GOLD COMMUNICATIONS GROUP TEMPLATE

Terms of Reference

To work in partnership between the emergency services, local and central government and other agencies, where appropriate, to develop a comprehensive communications strategy to respond to this incident, support the operational emergency response and keep the media apprised of the developing situation so they can inform and reassure the public.

Potential Attendees

NB These are not all obligatory attendees. * = optional

- Police Service (Chair)
- Ambulance Service
- Fire Service
- British Transport Police*
- Association of Chief Police Officers*
- SO 15/Metropolitan Police representative*
- Strategic Health Authority*
- Mayor's Office/local authority representative(s)
- Government Departments, e.g. Any/all of Home Office, Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Transport, Government News Network (GNN)*
- Transport agencies/organisations, Airport Authorities*
- Local tourism organisations*
- Business representatives (e.g. companies directly affected) *
- Environment Agency *
- Utility companies*

Agenda

- 1) Introductions
- 2) Minutes of any previous meetings
- 3) Matters arising
- 4) Current situation and risk assessment
 - Operational issues
 - Media coverage
 - Other issues
- 5) Urgent actions/issues to be considered
- 6) Updates from organisations

- 7) Messages for specific groups
- 8) Assessment of current strategy and activity
- 9) Next few hours/days
- 10) Any other business
- 11) Time of next meeting

NB It is important to allocate a note-taker who can produce minutes quickly.

Appendix (iii)

GUIDANCE ON SETTING UP A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CENTRE

Initial Set-up and Plan

The onsite press officer should implement/familiarise themselves with the following prior to the opening of the HAC:

- Location of media pen
- Layout and design of HAC site
- What is available to visitors/what they must bring with them
- Estimated time of completion/barriers that may prevent this
- Clearance criteria amongst partners for press releases — suggested, email to all lead press officers with clear turnaround time frame
- Agenda inclusion and daily meeting representation
- Designated partner press officer meeting times
- Spokesperson/s
- VIPs to be figureheads

Issues to be Considered in any Communication Activity

- Where the Humanitarian Assistance Centre is located
- How to get there (e.g. buses, underground etc)
- Why it exists
- How long will be operating for
- Who should attend
- What should visitors bring with them

Communication Delivery

There are various communication tools that can be used to deliver key messages:

Crisis Incident Media Handling

- Media pen set up for the press close to the venue and easily facilitated both in terms of security and protection from natural elements e.g. weather
- Statements/press releases
- Onsite/offsite interviews with designated spokesperson
- Regular media briefings at set times of the day - essential
- Tour of site *prior to* opening (no media should be allowed in while visitors are in attendance)
- Pooled UK media facility;
- Websites
- Include details as an add-on to messages about the wider incident

Proactive Advertising and Marketing

Marketing and advertising is key to the HAC's ability to fulfil its role, and thus this is one of the most important aspects of emergency planning.

As part of this overall guidance the lead agency should fund the marketing and advertising of the HAC. How they intend to fund this essential element of communication is an issue that must be addressed as part of their emergency plan.

Items of marketing and advertising to be considered:

- Posters and leaflets
- Newspaper/magazine advertising
- Radio adverts
- Directions to the site on streets/at train and bus stations
- Directions to parking/advice for transport

Any marketing and advertising should briefly cover the issues to be considered in any communication activity (detailed previously).

Vulnerabilities

During the initial stages of operation, issues could arise which could generate negative media coverage. These need to be considered in the overall communication strategy for the event. They include:

- Visitors to the HAC claiming publicly that it is not fit for purpose
- Incorrect address and phone details being provided
- Unexpected demand/unexpected under use
- Attendance of individuals who have lied about their identity
- Requirement to move to another location at short notice
- Further incidents requiring different/additional resources
- Foreign media interest outside of set briefing times

Thus the requirement for an onsite press officer at all times is high and the ability to mobilise press officer support at short notice is crucial.

Joined Up Communication

All partner agencies are reminded to:

- Only comment on their specific area of expertise
- Share press lines with each other
- Retain confidentiality of those who have attended the HAC
- Not comment on the wider incident where this is outside of their remit

Appendix (iv)

EXAMPLE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CENTRE MARKETING AND MEDIA PLAN - THAMES VALLEY POLICE

1. Thames Valley Police will be responsible for co-ordinating the marketing of the Humanitarian Assistance Centre and the management of media interest in the centre in the first instance. However, it is expected that this responsibility will pass to the relevant local authority after the first week in order that police resources can be freed up to deal with the incident.

Marketing

- 2.1 The first priority is the marketing of the centre. Although the police will lead on this in the first instance, there should be a multi agency approach but with all agencies recognising the need to make business promptly. If possible, a group of media and marketing officers from the relevant agencies should meet regularly to agree marketing and media actions. These actions should be clearly logged. The police lead should clear these actions through the police commander responsible for the centre before they are implemented.

Publicity

- 2.2 As much publicity as possible should be sought to encourage individuals to attend the centre. The publicity should include clear instructions on how to get to the centre, opening hours, facilities available, parking arrangements and public transport links.
- 2.3 Media - invite the media to view the centre before it is opened and offer interviews with a senior police officer, the relevant local authority chief executive and the lead charity. If interest is high, there may be a need for a pooled media facility. It needs to be made clear that media cannot attend the centre but that they will be kept up-to-date with developments via media briefings at least once daily during the first week. It may be necessary to set up a media pen or similar facility near to the centre where these briefings can be delivered. All media requests and responses given should be clearly logged by individual media and PR officers working at the centre.
- 2.4 Paid for advertising — local media may run some advertisements for the centre free of charge or at a reduced rate; if not, sponsorship should be sought to assist with the costs. Radio advertising is likely to be particularly helpful as it is immediate, and advertisements can run all day and night.
- 2.5 Publications — posters can be produced and put up in key locations such as libraries, parish notice boards, police stations, etc. Leaflets giving details of the centre can also be produced. Consideration needs to be given to translating all publications into other relevant languages.
- 2.6 Websites — all agencies involved should advertise the centre prominently on their websites.

- 2.7 VIP visits — these can generate valuable publicity for the centre particularly if they take place soon after the centre has opened, but will require resources to manage media.

Co-ordination of information

- 2.8 It is important that information coming out of the assistance centre does not clash with other information being released in connection with the incident. To avoid this happening the police lead at the centre will need to be in regular contact with the gold media adviser.
- 2.9 Information being released by all agencies at the centre should be cleared by the police commander via the police communications lead at the centre.

Appendix (v)

INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE GIVEN AS PART OF AN INITIAL HOLDING STATEMENT

- Confirm that emergency **services/police have been alerted to a** potential incident, including the time (if **known**) of the call(s) and, if appropriate, general location
- Give reassurance to the public that this is being dealt with professionally and that further information will be given as soon as available
- Give messages about remaining calm and waiting for news

INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE GIVEN *PREFERABLY* AFTER VERBAL

DISCUSSION WITH S015, GOLD COMMANDER ETC.

- Confirm that an incident has taken place
- Area has been sealed off/cleared
- Confirm evacuations and where to
- Traffic diversions. Any alternative arrangements for public transport
- Reassurance to the community that the emergency services are in attendance and dealing
- Confirm whether there have been casualties — **not** numbers or seriousness/nature of injuries at an early stage. *(This is due to the need to collate casualty figures centrally to avoid inaccurate information being released)*
- Details of hospitals casualties have been taken to
- Telephone number of Casualty Bureau if set up
- Remind media **not** to identify S015 or counter terrorism officers working at the scene.
- DO NOT OVER REACT.

Appendix (vi)

GUIDELINES FOR METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE STAFF ON DEALING WITH MEDIA REPORTERS, PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS AND TELEVISION CREWS

'I believe – and many of you believe – that a key factor in the way we work is how we treat one another and the members of the public with whom we come into contact.' *Ian Blair, Commissioner*

'We will build trust by listening and responding. Be accessible and approachable. Build relationships. Encourage others to challenge and get involved.'
Our values

Members of the media are not only members of the public; they can influence the way the Metropolitan Police Service is portrayed. It is important that we build good relationships with them, even when the circumstances are difficult. They have a duty to report many of those things that we have to deal with – crime, demonstrations, accidents, major events and incidents. This guide is designed to help you take the appropriate action when you have to deal with members of the media.

1. Members of the media have a duty to report from the scene of many of the incidents we have to deal with. We should actively help them carry out their responsibilities provided they do not interfere with ours.
2. Where it is necessary to put cordons in place, it is much better to provide the media with a good vantage point from which they can operate rather than to exclude them, otherwise they may try to get around the cordons and interfere with police operations. Providing an area for members of the media does not exclude them from operating from other areas to which the general public have access.
3. Members of the media have a duty to take photographs and film incidents and we have no legal power or moral responsibility to prevent or restrict what they record. It is a matter for their editors to control what is published or broadcast, not the police. Once images are recorded, we have no power to delete or confiscate them without a court order, even if we think they contain damaging or useful evidence.
4. If someone who is distressed or bereaved asks for police to intervene to prevent members of the media filming or photographing them, we may pass on their request but we have no power to prevent or restrict media activity. If they are trespassing on private property, the person who owns or controls the premises may eject them and may ask for your help in preventing a breach of the peace while they do so. The media have their own rules of conduct and complaints procedures if members of the public object.

5. To help you identify genuine members of the media, they carry identification, which they will produce to you on request. An example of the UK Press Card is shown below.
6. Members of the media do not need a permit to photograph or film in public places.
7. To enter private property while accompanying police, the media must obtain permission, which must be recorded, from the person who owns or is in control of the premises. We cannot give or deny permission to members of the media to enter private premises
8. whether the premises are directly involved in the police operation or not. This is a matter between the person who owns or is in control of the premises and the members of the media.
9. Giving members of the media access to incident scenes is a matter for the Senior Investigating Officer. The gathering of evidence and forensic retrieval make access unlikely in the early stages and this should be explained to members of the media. Requests for access should be passed to the Senior Investigating Officer who should allow access in appropriate cases as soon as practicable.
10. Advice and assistance in dealing with members of the media is available 24 hours a day via the Press Bureau at New Scotland Yard.

The UK Press Card

All the UK's professional reporters, photographers, and broadcast crews rely on swift public and official help to bring the news to Britain's homes and business. And every one of them can get a genuine UK Press Card.

The official UK Press Card is an excellent way to identify news gatherers in the aftermath of a major news event or at any other time. This is guaranteed by the UK Press Card Authority - gatekeepers, who represent all the organisations which employ or represent Britain's news gatherers.

At the core of the scheme is a unique photo card and hotline system managed jointly by the gatekeepers. It has a number of security features and is recognised by the Association of Chief Police Officers for England, Wales and by its sister organisation in Scotland, ACPOS.

Each UK Press Card has a unique serial number. Each cardholder has a separate personal identification number or word. By using the hotline – 0870 8376477 – anybody can verify that the card is genuine and that the holder is a bona fide news gatherer.

The card also has several secret security features in addition to the verification hotline. These are only revealed to the police or similar authorities. The card is produced using similar technology to the photo driving licence, with the photograph and design integrated into the structure of the card.

Every card carries the logo of the issuing organisation or the holder's employer together with the holder's name and the card serial number. And no card can be valid for more than two years, ensuring a periodic review of the holder's right to have it.

The UK Press Card Authority

The UK Press Card Scheme has been in operation since the early 1990s. It was set up to provide a single, national identity card for professional news gatherers, following the abolition of a press card issued by the Metropolitan Police Service. It is managed by the UK Press Card Authority Ltd. A list of designated gatekeepers is available on www.ukpresscardauthority.co.uk or through the Press Bureau at New Scotland Yard.

Appendix (vii)



Association of Chief Police Officers of England,
Wales and Northern Ireland

National Community Tension Team

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Protective marking	RESTRICTED
Disclosable under FOIA 2000	Yes
PURPOSE of Document	Provide guidance on the language that engages communities with regard to counter terrorism.
Key Points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language is very important and can include or exclude people. • This paper gives guidance to help Forces. • A press release by Central Scotland Police Force is attached as an example of good practice.
Author	Chief Supt. Andrew Pratt
Recipient (s)	ACPO (TAM) Advisory Group
File owner	Chief Supt. Andrew Pratt
Date created	9th October 2007
Date for review	31 October 2007
DATE DISCHARGED Approved	

INTRODUCTION

To deliver the objectives of the PREVENT strand of the counter-terrorism (CT) strategy we must engage effectively with local communities.

As Police Forces will already be aware, to engage effectively with local communities there needs to be consistently clear and appropriate communications. If messages are ambiguous or untargeted, they will not reach or be understood by those who need to hear them, and we risk having a negative impact on our audiences.

On the basis of in-depth qualitative research into how messages are received by community audiences commissioned by the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) and informal feedback from communities, this paper sets out:

- General principles for communicating with community audiences;
- The topline CT messages – unpacked into detailed messages;
- Guidance on the use of specific terminology.

This paper is intended to be used only as a general guide for communicating with PREVENT audiences, and should supplement existing knowledge and experience in local authorities. It is not intended to be prescriptive. The success of any communication depends upon the consideration of a number of specific factors, including the context in which it is delivered and the relationship between the messenger and the audience.

CT communications is a sensitive area and one where there are considerable knowledge gaps. Central Government and its partners must therefore continue to listen to key audiences to understand the impact of communications activity.

GENERAL COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES

- As a basic principle, it is important to demonstrate that you **have listened to and understand the concerns of your audience**, making specific references to your experiences in doing so if possible.
- The messages and language you use should be **clear and straightforward**. If the communication is over-complicated, it provides the audience with an excuse not to listen to you or consider your arguments. In addition, where audiences are already sensitive, language and concepts that are not easily understood may be assumed to be an attack on them.
- Whilst you should talk openly about the nature of the terrorist challenge, it is important to **avoid implying that specific communities are to blame**. Apart from being untrue, this is divisive and undermines the unified community response required to tackle the terrorist threat. For the same reason, you should avoid talking to specific communities solely in the context of terrorism.
- Be aware of **direct and overhearing audiences**. Messages aimed at one target audience can have an inadvertent, negative impact on others. It is important to weigh up the potential secondary impact of a message before

going ahead. In today's media, a message delivered domestically can quickly be replayed internationally, and in turn recycled back into the UK, including through terrorist propaganda.

- If you recycle language used by terrorists, you risk **reinforcing their message**, thereby conferring legitimacy upon terrorist groups.

TOPLINE CT MESSAGES

The three top-line messages to community audiences are:

- 1. Terrorism is a real and serious threat to us all.**
- 2. Terrorists are criminals and murderers and they attack the values that we all share.**
- 3. We all need to work together to tackle the terrorist challenge.**

These messages work by firstly establishing that there is a serious threat - cutting through any culture of denial that may exist. Secondly, they deglamorise terrorism and separate terrorists from the rest of society. This then provides the 'inclusive' basis from which to start a conversation about what we all need to do to tackle the problem - as individuals, in communities and as a society.

DETAILED MESSAGES

- 1. Terrorism is a real and serious threat to us all.**

- 1.1) The terrorist threat to the UK and UK interests abroad is severe and sustained.**

In July 2007, the Security Services and police were working to contend with approximately 200 groups or networks, totalling around 2000 identified individuals, who are actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist acts here and overseas - and there will be many more we don't know about. British and foreign nationals linked to or sympathetic to terrorist activity are known to be present within the UK. They are supporting the activities of terrorist groups in a range of ways – by providing resources, false documents, training and fundraising for terrorist groups, as well as by engaging in the direct planning or implementing of terrorist attacks.

- 1.2) We are tackling the terrorist threat as we would any other criminal activity.**

This includes robust legislation to deal effectively with those who are suspected of and found guilty of carrying out terrorist activities. The UK has achieved some significant successes in dealing with potential attacks by terrorist networks, since before 2001. A number of credible plots to cause loss of life have been disrupted; in many cases the individuals involved have either been successfully prosecuted and imprisoned or are awaiting trial.

- 1.3) We are determined that the terrorist threat will not undermine our commitment to a diverse and open society built on democracy and shared values.**

We understand that certain communities feel under particular pressure as a result of the terrorist threat. The measures we have put in place to deal with the increased threat apply equally to all citizens regardless of their background. We are working to protect our shared values (respect for human rights; the rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech, and freedom of religious practice) and ensure that in Britain all forms of discrimination are eliminated and communities are well integrated. These values belong to everyone – to those across all religious denominations and to those with no religious faith.

What works about this message?

- Tough messages can resonate well - audiences need to understand the reality of the situation and the severity of the threat, especially if they are in denial.
- Avoids accusations of deliberate scaremongering by providing specific examples of the nature of the terrorist threat.
- Specific evidence of what the Police is doing, in partnership with communities, to tackle the threat can provide reassurance to balance what can be a frightening message. Recognises that some people feel singled out, but robustly rejects the accusation that this is racially or religiously motivated.

2. Terrorists are criminals and murderers and they attack the values that we all share.

2.1) Terrorists actively aim to damage community relations, undermine the values we all share and create divisions.

The words and acts of terrorist groups and individuals encourage hatred and feed further extremism against minority communities. Terrorists attack the values that we all share, as decent and peaceful people, and aim to destroy the societies on which those values are based.

2.2) Terrorism is not the product of any one religion or community.

Terrorists talk about violence, murder and hatred. None of the world's major religions teach this, and I know that people are appalled when their religion is twisted in an attempt to justify terrorism. We are opposed to all forms of extremism, including that of the far right, which glorify or lead individuals to commit acts of violence. This is why we brought in religious hatred legislation which was designed to tackle those who incite hatred and by doing so cause divisions within our communities.

Violent extremism is emphatically condemned by all communities in the UK. Whilst there is a current CT focus on individuals from particular communities, we know that these individuals in no way represent the views and beliefs held by the vast majority. Terrorists operate in isolation from mainstream communities and are the enemies of us all.

What works about this message?

- It builds a common sense of purpose, reinforcing the idea that terrorists are enemies to us all, and provides the basis from which to enlist community support in preventing further terrorist atrocities.
- Talking about 'dividing lines' between terrorists and everyone else is often misunderstood (even when it is explicitly explained). This message needs clear explanation and credible delivery if it is to work effectively – and works best when inclusivity through the concept of shared values has been established.
- It avoids implicitly branding whole communities as being responsible for terrorism. This has previously been a source of objection and defensiveness from some key audiences.
- It distinguishes and defines terrorists by their actions (e.g. 'criminals') rather than their motivations (e.g. 'ideological') and therefore avoids implying that any one religion is to blame. This approach is used regularly by commentators who see it as a description of how base the action is and how far removed the perpetrators are from normal societal or religious values.
- It avoids use of terms which can be seen to link terrorism with religion and therefore confer misplaced legitimacy on the violent extremist cause.
- It avoids militaristic metaphors, which can be negatively received and can reinforce terrorists' claims to be soldiers fighting a legitimate battle, rather than mere criminals.
- It makes reference to our opposition to all forms of extremism (e.g. right wing extremism).

We all need to work together to tackle the terrorist challenge.

3.1) Security measures are only one part of the solution. The responsibility to tackle violent extremism is one we all share.

We will not be successful without the active support and engagement of all parts of Government; our partners; the public, private and voluntary sectors; and all of us as individuals and members of communities. It is everyone's responsibility to do what they can to tackle the challenge. We must work together towards a secure Britain that offers safety and the protection of rights for everyone – regardless of their faith, race or ethnicity. We are working with communities to challenge violence, hatred and terrorism of all forms, including racial bigotry and gang violence. Communities can help by building on the excellent work they are already doing in leading the debate against violence, hatred and terrorism.

3.2) The most important challenge for us all is to work towards creating cohesive and resilient communities within which the terrorist messages will not resonate.

We must look beyond individuals, to the importance of strengthening society as a whole. We are committed to creating an inclusive and diverse society where all communities identify themselves as part of a wider British society and are accepted as such – and extremist activity is actively rejected. If everyone is able to participate fully in society and have the opportunities they deserve, regardless of race, faith or ethnicity, then individuals are likely to be far less susceptible to terrorist propaganda and active recruitment efforts. We will continue to work at national, regional and local level to help build cohesive communities from the ground up.

3.3) We are working with communities to help those who do find themselves in an isolated position and vulnerable to the terrorists' messages.

We must protect our young people, a minority of whom are at risk of being influenced by violent extremists and being recruited into dangerous and criminal activity. We know that communities are working hard to establish activities to challenge violent extremism. It is difficult to tell whether someone is involved with violent extremists, so it is important that we all work together and share information about how individuals are drawn into violent extremism in order to help prevent more vulnerable people from becoming involved in terrorist activity in the future.

What works about this message?

- It uses inclusive language that emphasises that it is everyone's responsibility to work together and avoids alienating particular communities by singling them out in any way.
- It talks about specific ways in which communities can support the CT effort only within this broader context of shared responsibility (and highlights what the Police itself is doing).
- It doesn't imply that communities necessarily know when a young person is being 'brainwashed' – they don't. It acknowledges that it is difficult to know when someone is being 'brainwashed' - terrorist recruiters are very subtle.

Annex 1: Language Table

The following guidance provides a summary of how certain words and phrases are received by community audiences. It is not intended as a definitive list of 'what not to say', but rather to highlight terms which risk being misunderstood and therefore prevent the effective reception of the message. This is not about political correctness, but effectiveness -- evidence shows that people stop listening if they think you're attacking them.

Any assessment of the language to be used must take account of the context in which messages will be delivered and the crucial role of the messenger.

WHAT IS SAID	WHAT IS HEARD	POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
The dividing line is between terrorists and the rest of us	This can be a positive message, but only with a credible messenger and if explained clearly	Ensure the context is clear
Communities need to stand up to extremism/weed out terrorist sympathisers	"Communities are to blame for extremism and are responsible for hiding terrorists in their midst"	We all share responsibility for tackling violent extremism, and there are specific tasks that communities can help us with
Struggle for values/battle for ideas	"Confrontation/clash between civilisations/ cultures"	The idea of shared values works much more effectively
War/battle/clash	"Terrorists/criminals are warriors/soldiers fighting a cause "	Challenge/threat
Radicalisation	"Terrorism is a product of Islam" (not easily understood or translated into Urdu/Arabic)	Encouraging people towards violent extremism
Grooming or conditioning	Can be useful terms to describe 'radicalisation' process without reinforcing the link with religion, however not generally understood by all audiences	Brainwashing or indoctrination
De-radicalisation	As above, not easily understood or translatable to all audiences	Rehabilitation
Islamic/ Muslim	Be aware of the distinction – the former refers to the belief; the latter to the believer/individual	none
Moderate/radical	Perceived as a means of splitting Muslim communities or stigmatising points of view/lifestyles that are deemed to be less favourable to Government	Muslims (where necessary mainstream Muslims)
Islamic/Islamist/Muslim extremism	"Extremism is the fault of Muslims/Islam"	Terrorism/violent extremism (including from non-Muslims)
Jihadi/fundamentalist	"There is an explicit link between Islam and terrorism"	Criminal/murderer/thug
Islamic/Muslim community/world "The West"	"Muslims form a homogenous community/world (in opposition to "The West")"	Highlight diversity, rather than reinforcing the concept of a homogenous Muslim world. Use national/ ethnic/ geographical identifiers or Muslim communities/societies
Islamophobia	Can be misunderstood as a slur on Islam and perceived as singling out Muslims (even though it indicates that we are positively addressing their concerns)	Discrimination

Central Scotland Police

Press Release

September 17 2007

STATEMENT FROM CENTRAL SCOTLAND POLICE

On April 13 2006, Central Scotland Police officers arrested a 20-year-old man, Mohammed Atif Siddique, from Alva, Clackmannanshire, under the Terrorism Act 2000. He was subsequently charged with a total of four offences under Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006 and breach of the peace.

Assistant Chief Constable Maureen Brown, who was in overall charge of Operation Niche, said: "Today's conviction at the High Court in Glasgow concludes one of the most challenging investigations ever conducted by Central Scotland Police.

"Mohammed Atif Siddique has been convicted of serious terrorism offences and I wish to make absolutely clear at the outset that this investigation has only ever been about one thing – criminality. It was not about communities or a particular faith.

"What this case has demonstrated is that we will not tolerate terrorism in any form, including the possession of materials which would be useful to someone wanting to commit an act of terrorism or to induce or encourage someone to take such a course of action. Our actions were carried out firmly in the interests of wider public safety.

"Central Scotland Police led the inquiry but this was a multi-agency investigation from the outset and is a prime example of different law enforcement organisations working together to address a particular issue. Some of these organisations supplied officers to work alongside Central Scotland Police teams.

"This inquiry was large in scale and complex. It meant gathering evidence from more than 5100 computer discs, the analysis of 34 computer hard drives, analysis of 25 telephones and a further 19 SIM cards. Six cars, two houses and one business premises were also searched. It was made even more challenging as the material seized had to be translated from three languages – Urdu, Arabic and Punjabi.

"This has been a challenging time for our local community in Central Scotland and Alva and there have been difficult issues to discuss. We have worked alongside the community throughout this period, to provide reassurance and appropriate levels of information. There is a strong track record of community relations in Central Scotland and through lay advisers, community contact officers at local mosques and other communications forums with the public, this has been maintained and enhanced with support and understanding shown for the police inquiry and the minority ethnic community. We have also maintained a dialogue with the Siddique family through a number of channels.

"This case and other recent events have shown that terrorism is not just an issue for the major cities in England. The threat is with us now, it's real and we should all take responsibility for helping to tackle it."

Superintendent Andrew Price, the Area Commander for Clackmannanshire, said: "Locally, we have maintained a dialogue with members of the entire community since April 13 2007 and have sought to give reassurance wherever it was required.

"Clackmannanshire is vibrant, close-knit and diverse community, it is not a sprawling urban environment which might be considered by some to provide a more likely background to a case such as this. The community has responded maturely and responsibly to the events which unfolded on April 13 2006. I would reiterate that Central Scotland Police and the community of Clackmannanshire will not tolerate intolerance towards any member of the public because of race or religion.

"We will work with the public and all of our partners to ensure that this remains a place that is safe and welcoming to all."

ENDS

Issued by Force Media Office
Tel 01786 456 370/379
www.centalscotland.police.uk

Note to Newsdesks: In many reports on April 14 2006, members of the public were quoted as saying a number of firearms officers were involved in the operation. We would like to state categorically that no firearms officers were deployed as part of the operation carried out on April 13 2006. Officers who entered the address were wearing full protective public order clothing.



Appendix (viii)

TEMPLATE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

Aim

- To enhance the reputation of Greater Manchester Police in the careful development of counter terrorist work

Objectives

- To develop community confidence in the considerations of implications of counter terrorist activity
- To reassure all communities that the police are working in most appropriate way
- To explain considerations of counter terrorist operations particularly liaison with community
- To encourage balanced and accurate reporting by the media, particularly when action takes place
- To develop links to diversity command and work on tackling hate crime

Key Messages

- GMP is focused on protecting people and is aware of the impact action can have on communities
- We need the help, support and information from local communities to tackle this threat
- Extensive discussions take place to consider implications of activity and this involves an independent advisor
- Very careful planning takes place before any action is taken and much of this focuses on what impact there may be on communities

Audience

- Communities across Greater Manchester
- Minority ethnic communities across Greater Manchester, and particularly in Manchester
- Key community representatives
- MPs and councillors
- Key media outlets/reporters
- Relevant partner agencies

Methods

Focus to be on the face-to-face communication – supported by written material. Spokespeople to be XXXXXXXX

Media briefings – one to one interviews with selected media and those interested media organisations eg Asian News
 Radio interviews – with selected outlets eg Radio Ramadhaan, All FM
 Radio advertising – identify opportunities
 Internet – information to be developed to add to the counter terrorist section of the Force website
 Translation – key messages to be translated for use as required eg ads, website etc
 Poss letters to specialist media
 Poss look at advertising in specialist media
 Briefings – to key agencies/ local community representatives as appropriate
 Partner Bulletin – use corporate documents to highlight the work to MPs and Councillors
 Liaise with Diversity command about any specific issues
 Media monitoring – provide regular updates on related issues identified in the media

Action plan

Date	Action	Assigned to

Evaluation

Review articles/interviews for positive, negative and neutral messages
 Assess community feedback through media and websites

USEFUL CONTACT NUMBERS/WEBSITE ADDRESSES

Specialist Operations Press Desk, (Metropolitan Police Service) 020 7230 4094

Cabinet Office Press Office (Civil Contingency Unit) 020 7276 1191

IPCC Press Office 0207 166 3214

Home Office Press Office 020 7035 3535

ACPO Press Office 020 7084 8945

BBC Connecting in a Crisis -

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis/index.shtml>

www.resilience.info

Appendix (ix) – ACPO Workbook



WORKBOOK FOR THE CREATION OF ACPO GUIDANCE/PRACTICE ADVICE

Title of Draft Guidance/Practice Advice Document

Guidance Notes on media handling and communication activity at Major Incidents (including counter terrorism incidents)

ACPO Reference Number

Unique reference number: 2008/05

ACPO Commissioning

Name of ACPO Business Area:	Presidential
Head of Business Area commissioning the work:	Chief Constable Ken Jones
Date Authorised:	16.04.08
Projected date of completion:	30.09.08

Person Completing Work Book

Name:	Force Address:
T/CI Nick Barker	BTP FHQ, 25 Camden Road, London NW1 9LN
Email address:	Contact Tel. No:
Nicholas.barker@btp.pnn.police.uk	0207 830 8930

Date the first page of this Workbook was completed and forwarded to the [Programme Support Office](#):

25.04.08

For ACPO use only

Date QA check completed:	26 August 2008
Date referred to HBA:	26 August 2008
Date Guidelines/Practice Advice signed off by HBA:	26 August 2008

SECTION A - FOR USE ONLY WHERE AN EXISTING GUIDANCE OR PRACTICE ADVICE DOCUMENT IS BEING AMENDED AS THE RESULT OF A REVIEW

A.1 Title of original document:

N/A

A.2 Date of publication of original document:

SECTION B – IMPACT UPON OTHER ACPO BUSINESS AREAS

B.1 Give details of the impact on/dependencies with other ACPO Business Areas and existing Guidance/Advice

N/A

If B.1 applies, please inform the relevant ACPO Policy Officer who will consult across other business areas

SECTION C - ACPO EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE (DIVERSITY AUDIT) AS AGREED WITH THE CRE

C1. Identify all aims of the guidance/advice

C.1.1 Identify the aims and projected outcomes of the guidance/advice:
The Guidance aims to encourage consistency of practice by the Police Service when dealing with the media and also considers the wider communications issues at a major incident including counter terrorism
C.1.2 Which individuals and organisations are likely to have an interest in or likely to be affected by the proposal?
Force Media /Communication Departments, Senior Officers involved in Media handling at Major Incidents

C2. Consider the evidence

C.2.1 What relevant quantitative data has been considered?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A

Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.2.2 What relevant qualitative information has been considered?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.2.3 What gaps in data/information were identified?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.2.4 What consideration has been given to commissioning research?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A

C3. Assess likely impact

C.3.1 From the analysis of data and information has any potential for differential/adverse impact been identified?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.3.2 If yes explain any intentional impact:	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.3.3 If yes explain what impact was discovered which you feel is justifiable in order to achieve the overall proposal aims. Please provide examples:	

Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.3.4 Are there any other factors that might help to explain differential /adverse impact?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A

C4. Consider alternatives

C.4.1 Summarise what changes have been made to the proposal to remove or reduce the potential for differential/adverse impact:
N/A
C.4.2 Summarise changes to the proposal to remove or reduce the potential for differential/adverse impact that were considered but not implemented and explain why this was the case:
N/A
C.4.3 If potential for differential/adverse impact remains explain why implementation is justifiable in order to meet the wider proposal aims:
N/A

C5. Consult formally

C.5.1 Has the proposal been subject to consultation? If no, please state why not. If yes, state which individuals and organisations were consulted and what form the consultation took:	
Force media officers across the country have been consulted and NPIA were contacted to ensure there were no duplications of effort. PNICC and Carol McCall, who coordinates the Cabinet Office News Co-Ordination Centre, have provided input on their respective roles. The guidance also incorporates advice from the National Communities Tension Team	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A
Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.5.2 What was the outcome of the consultation?	
Age	N/A
Disability	N/A
Gender	N/A
Race	N/A
Religion / Belief	N/A

Sexual Orientation	N/A
C.5.3 Has the proposal been reviewed and/or amended in light of the outcomes of consultation?	
The guidance incorporates good practice from the consultation process.	
C.5.4 Have the results of the consultation been fed back to the consultees?	
The results of the consultation are reflected in the A-Z guides and examples of best practice	

C6. Decide whether to adopt the proposal

C.6.1 Provide a statement outlining the findings of the impact assessment process. If the proposal has been identified as having a possibility to adversely impact upon diverse communities, the statement should include justification for the implementation:
N/A

C7. Make Monitoring Arrangements

C.7.1 What consideration has been given to piloting the proposal?
The guidance merely provides standardisation of handling of the media and many of its recommendations are already common practice within forces. There are no plans to pilot the guidance
C.7.2 What monitoring will be implemented at a national level by the proposal owning agency and/or other national agency?
As part of the recognised debrief after any major incident any comments will be fed back to ACPO MAG
C.7.3 Is this proposal intended to be implemented by local agencies that have a statutory duty to impact assess policies? If so, what monitoring requirements are you placing on that agency?
N/A

C8. Publish Assessment Results

C.8.1 What form will the publication of the impact assessment take?
<i>It is recommended that for publication on the ACPO website, the impact assessment be attached to the completed document as the first appendix. On the ACPO Intranet, the whole workbook will be attached to assist in the preparation of local audits.</i>

SECTION D - HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW

D1. Does the proposal have significant human rights implications, either for the public or for the Police Service? Answer YES or NO:

No

If NO, go straight to Section E

If YES, answer the following questions and consider seeking legal advice

D.1.1. Who will be affected by this proposal?

- Consider not only the direct subject of the proposal, but also other people who may be affected (e.g. bystanders, victims, general public, police staff, subject's family)

D.1.2 Which of their rights are being protected?

- E.g. the right to life; right to security; freedom of belief, expression or assembly; right to family life; right to privacy; right to property

D.1.3 For each person or group of people, which of their Convention rights may the proposal potentially interfere with and how?

- E.g. right to life; prohibition of degrading treatment; right to liberty; right to fair trial; right to due process; right to privacy; freedom of belief, expression, assembly and association

Answer the following questions in respect of each interference with a right.

D.1.4 Is the interference legal? Explain in full:

- e.g. European legislation, Act of Parliament, statutory instrument, statutory codes, common law

D.1.5. Is the interference necessary? Explain in full:

- It may for example be justified if it protects others' rights, e.g. right to life; right to security; freedom of belief, expression or assembly; right to family life; right to privacy; right to property
- What "legitimate aims" under the Convention are being pursued in interfering with the right?

D.1.6 Is the interference proportionate? Explain in full:

- What practical alternative actions are available? Will any of these not interfere or interfere less with a right? If they will, why are they not being used?
- Is the interference the least intrusive means available?

D.1.7 Having considered the above points, do you consider that the proposal -

(a) Breaches a Convention right? YES or NO:

(b) Is vulnerable to challenge? YES or NO

Note: interference with a right does not equal a breach – if an interference is justified, there is no breach.

If the answer to (a) or (b) above is YES and you consider that there is a breach of a Convention right or that the proposal is vulnerable to challenge, seek legal advice.

SECTION E - DATA PROTECTION REVIEW

E.1 Does this proposal relate in any way to the processing of personal data? Answer YES or NO. If NO, go straight to Section F.

If YES, outline how it complies with the Data Protection Act, listing the principles summarised below. The ACPO Data Protection and FOI Portfolio Group will provide assistance in identifying and addressing compliance:

No

The Principles:

- a) Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully ...*
- b) Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more lawful purposes ...*
- c) Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed*
- d) Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date*
- e) Personal data processed for any purpose shall not be kept longer than is necessary for that purpose*
- f) Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under the Act*
- g) Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data ...*
- h) Personal data shall not be transferred to any country outside the European Economic Area (EEA) unless the country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to processing of personal data*

SECTION F - HEALTH & SAFETY REVIEW

F.1 Does this proposal have significant health and safety implications for the public or for police staff? Answer YES or NO.

No

If YES, answer questions F.2. & F.3. If NO, go straight to Section G1.

F.2 Explain how the risks to health and safety have been assessed and what control measures have been put in place:

F.3 What are the health and safety duties and who is responsible for them? Explain in full:

SECTION G - BUREAUCRACY REVIEW

G.1 List the forms or databases that police staff will be required to complete as part of this proposal:

Nil

G.2 Give details of how you have reviewed the need for, content of and appropriateness of the forms or databases. Have you reduced their quantity or content?

Factors to consider:

- *Whether the benefit of gathering the information exceeds the effort*
- *The cumulative impact – especially when there is repeated entry of the same information*
- *Retention period – is the information disposed of at the optimum time?*

N/A

SECTION H - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REVIEW

H.1 Is this reviewed proposal exempt from publication under the FOIA?
Answer YES or NO:

No

IF NO, go straight to Section I. If YES, give full details of the exemptions that apply and the reasons for them at H.2.1 – 2.3 below:

H.2 Reasons for Non- or Partial Disclosure under Freedom of Information Act 2000

H.2.1 Is this document completely non-disclosable? Answer YES or NO

H.2.2 If yes, why? Which exemptions apply?

Section	Description and Type of Exemption	Evidence / Rationale for Application

--	--	--

H.2.3 Is this document partially disclosable? Answer YES or NO

--

H.2.4 If yes, which parts of the document are not disclosable and why? Which exemptions apply?

Part of the Document	Section	Description and Type of Exemption	Evidence / Rationale for Application

SECTION I – IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

I.1 Now that the audit is complete the Guidance/Advice document should be prepared for consideration by the Head of Business Area - either for approval and sign-off or, in some cases, referral to ACPO Cabinet or Council. Please follow the attached ACPO Practice Guidance/Advice Template.

I.2 Please ensure that a full consultation on the content of the final draft document is conducted with stakeholders, both internal and external and ensure that their views are fully considered. Please detail below the organisations/individuals consulted:

PNICC, NCC, Force Communication Dept's
--

I.3 Full consideration should be given to the following:

- Financial implications/benefits
- Resource implications/benefits
- Potential performance/service improvements
- Risks
- Learning requirement

Monitoring and Review

I.4 Detail below the on-going effects of this proposal:

Better structure to Media Handling at Major Incidents

I.5 How will it be monitored?

After Major Incident or planned exercises

I.6 By whom?

DCC Andy Trotter

I.7 At what intervals?

As well as specific De briefs the Guidance will be reviewed every 3 years

I.8 When is the next review of this proposal planned?

21 August 2011